Border Crossings — What The Charts Actually Show

U.S. Customs and Border Protection publishes encounter data at cbp.gov. These are the official numbers — the same ones cited by both parties. The question is never what the numbers say; it’s what they mean.

Before we show the chart, a critical warning: these numbers are not comparable across the full timeline. Pre-2020 figures count “apprehensions” (one category). Post-2020 figures count “encounters” (multiple categories including Title 42 expulsions). The methodology changes — covered in Part 2 — inflate the post-2020 numbers by an estimated 26–38%. The chart below shows the raw official numbers. The real story requires the adjustments that follow.

Source: CBP Nationwide Encounters, cbp.gov; Pew Research Center (Feb 2, 2026)

Monthly data tells a more granular story than annual totals. The peak month was December 2023, with approximately 302,000 Southwest border encounters. By February 2025, that figure had fallen to roughly 9,100 — and by January 2026, to approximately 6,100. That is a 98% decline from peak to present.

This decline did not begin on January 20, 2025. Encounters started dropping in mid-2024 following Biden administration executive actions in June 2024 restricting asylum claims when encounters exceeded a threshold. The trend then accelerated dramatically after the Trump administration took office and issued a series of executive orders.

CBP tracks three demographic categories: single adults, family units (one or more children under 18 with a parent), and unaccompanied children (minors without a parent). The composition has shifted significantly:

Source: CBP Encounter Data, disaggregated tables. FY2025 UAC figure: ~5,700 apprehended in 10 months through Nov 2025.

The FY2025 unaccompanied children figure — on track for roughly 6,840 for the year — represents a 93% decline from FY2023’s 137,000. Family unit crossings have also fallen sharply in absolute terms, though they now represent a larger share of a much smaller total.

Title 42 (42 U.S.C. § 265) was invoked on March 20, 2020 under the Trump administration as a public health order and remained in effect until May 11, 2023. It allowed CBP to rapidly expel migrants — often within hours — without any immigration hearing or formal removal order.

The critical problem for data analysis: Title 42 expulsions carried no legal penalty for re-entry. A person expelled on Monday could attempt to cross again on Tuesday with zero additional legal consequences. Each attempt was counted as a separate “encounter.”

The result: during Title 42, recidivism surged to 26–38% of total encounters in peak months, compared to approximately 7–9% pre-2020. In FY2021, CBP’s own data showed a 27% overall recidivism rate — meaning roughly one in four “encounters” was someone being counted again. For Mexican and Northern Triangle nationals specifically, recidivism reached 49% by mid-2022.

What this means: FY2021’s 1.73 million encounters likely represented approximately 1.2 million unique individuals — not 1.73 million. FY2023’s 2.48 million raw encounters, adjusted for the roughly 26% recidivism rate during the first half of the year, drops to an estimated 1.8–2.0 million unique individuals. This makes it comparable to — not dramatically higher than — FY2000’s 1.64 million apprehensions.

Sources: CBP recidivism data in monthly operational updates; Migration Policy Institute, “Title 42 Postmortem,” April 2024; DHS Southwest Border Enforcement Report FY2021

Before March 2020, CBP reported “apprehensions” — people physically detained between ports of entry. People presenting at ports of entry requesting asylum were counted separately as “inadmissibles.”

Beginning in FY2020, CBP switched to reporting “encounters,” which combines:

1. Title 8 apprehensions (between ports of entry)
2. OFO inadmissibles (people presenting at legal ports of entry)
3. Title 42 expulsions (rapid public-health returns)

This definitional change means FY2020+ totals are not directly comparable to pre-FY2020 figures without adjustment. In FY2023, approximately 15–20% of encounters were at ports of entry — people presenting legally for inspection. They were absent from pre-2020 “apprehension” counts.

CBP One was a mobile application launched in January 2023 that allowed asylum seekers to schedule appointments at ports of entry. At peak operation, it processed roughly 1,000–1,450 appointments per day at eight Southwest border ports — approximately 30,000–43,000 individuals per month.

By October 2024, over 850,000 appointments had been scheduled. These were counted as OFO encounters, adding to the total “encounter” number. CBP One was terminated on January 20, 2025 by executive order.

Why this matters for data: Someone who would have crossed illegally between ports and been counted as one type of encounter instead scheduled a legal appointment and was counted as a different type. The total encounter number might not change, but the composition — and what it implies about enforcement — is fundamentally different.

High border-crossing volumes are not a recent phenomenon. FY1986 saw approximately 1.6 million apprehensions. FY2000 hit 1.64 million — the pre-2020 record. These occurred with no Title 42 recidivism inflation and no “encounters” terminology adding port-of-entry processing.

The difference is who was crossing and what happened next. In FY2000, roughly 98% of apprehensions were Mexican nationals — mostly single adult males who could be returned to Mexico within hours. The legal and logistical simplicity of processing made high volumes manageable in ways that today’s diverse flows are not.

This is arguably the most important change in border dynamics — and the most overlooked in political debate.

Sources: CBP nationality breakdown tables; Pew Research Center, 2024; Migration Policy Institute

Why this matters for enforcement: Mexican nationals can be returned to Mexico relatively quickly. Venezuelan, Cuban, and Nicaraguan nationals generally cannot be easily deported because their home governments often refuse to accept deportation flights. This creates a structural enforcement asymmetry entirely absent from pre-2010 data. When politicians compare FY2023 encounter volumes to FY2000 as evidence of a “worse” crisis, they are comparing two fundamentally different situations.

Historically, the vast majority of unauthorized crossings occurred between official ports of entry. This has shifted. In FY2023, approximately 430,000 unauthorized arrivals were processed at legal ports of entry — more than double FY2022’s 173,000. By FY2024, with CBP One at peak operation, nearly 50% of nationwide encounters occurred at ports of entry, compared to roughly 15% in FY2021.

A substantial portion of port encounters represent people seeking asylum through a legal process. Categorizing them alongside illegal crossings between ports — as the total “encounter” number does — conflates legal and illegal entry in a way that inflates the perception of unauthorized crossing.

“Got-aways” are CBP’s term for individuals detected by sensors, cameras, or other means who evaded apprehension. These are not guesses — they are based on sensor detections minus apprehensions in the same area — but they are still estimates with significant uncertainty.

Official estimates: approximately 600,000 got-aways in FY2022, roughly 670,000 in FY2023 (per FOIA-obtained CBP data), and a cumulative total of approximately 1.4–2 million since FY2021. The Congressional Budget Office uses broader demographic modeling and estimated approximately 860,000 for FY2023 — the difference reflects methodology (CBP counts sensor detections; CBO infers from population flows). These figures come primarily from FOIA releases, Congressional testimony, and media briefings — no single published government report with clear methodology exists. This is a genuine data gap.

Got-aways declined substantially after Title 42 ended — the Cato Institute documented a roughly 70% drop in successful evasions — because Title 8 consequences made evading apprehension more attractive than being caught and formally removed with a multi-year re-entry bar.

What got-away data cannot tell us: who these individuals are. By definition, their characteristics are unknown. Extrapolating criminal intent or national security threats onto an unknown population is speculation, not analysis. What is legitimate: the sheer number represents a meaningful gap in border security that concerns analysts across the political spectrum.

Raw encounter numbers reveal nothing about outcomes. This requires tracking data from ICE, the immigration courts (EOIR), and the asylum system:

• Title 42 expulsions (FY2020–23): Returned immediately; no hearing, no formal record
• Title 8 expedited removal: Removed within days if no credible fear claim established
• Credible fear → immigration court: Released on parole or bond; wait times of 3–5+ years for hearing
• In absentia removal orders: TRAC data suggests 20–30% of released migrants fail to appear
• Asylum grant rate: Approximately 30–45% for those who complete proceedings

The immigration court backlog stands at 3.7 million+ pending cases as of 2024 (EOIR data). This backlog means that even robust enforcement at the border is followed by a system that cannot adjudicate claims for years — creating a de facto release for most encountered individuals, regardless of which administration is in power.

Sources: EOIR Statistical Yearbooks; TRAC Immigration (trac.syr.edu); DHS FY2023 Enforcement Lifecycle Report

Enforcement data contradicts this claim directly. Biden’s DHS removed or expelled approximately 4.8 million individuals across FY2021–FY2024 — the most in any four-year presidential period, though many were rapid Title 42 expulsions rather than formal removals.

For formal Title 8 processing: after Title 42 ended in May 2023, the Biden administration carried out approximately 660,000 removals and returns in the following 12 months — the highest since FY2011. Biden’s June 2024 executive action restricting asylum claims drove a significant decline in encounters before he left office.

What is accurate: Record numbers of people crossed. Record numbers were released into the interior pending hearings. The immigration court backlog grew. Encounter numbers hit all-time raw highs. The claim conflates high-volume crossing with absence of enforcement — both can be true simultaneously.

In Trump’s first term, encounters rose sharply in FY2019 to approximately 977,000 — a near-record that prompted Trump himself to declare a national emergency. The subsequent decline was driven primarily by COVID-19 and Title 42, not solely by policy. By October 2020 (the end of FY2020), encounters were rising again to ~71,000/month.

In Trump’s second term, the data is dramatic: FY2025 Southwest border apprehensions totaled 237,538 — the lowest since 1970. Monthly encounters fell to single-digit thousands. For five consecutive months, CBP reported zero migrants released into communities.

Important context: The decline began in late 2024, before Trump took office, driven partly by Biden’s executive actions and partly by anticipation of the incoming administration’s policies. Disentangling policy effects from anticipation effects from seasonal patterns is not possible with the data available. What is clear: the combined effect is a historic decline by any measure.

Technically true for FY2022–23 by raw totals. Misleading for three reasons:

1. Title 42 recidivism inflated totals by 26–38% — the same individuals counted multiple times
2. The switch from “apprehensions” to “encounters” added port-of-entry processing absent from pre-2020 data
3. FY2000’s 1.64 million apprehensions involved almost entirely single adults returned the same day; FY2023’s encounters include complex asylum cases requiring prolonged processing

Adjusted for recidivism alone, FY2023’s roughly 2.48 million encounters represents an estimated 1.8–2.0 million unique individuals — comparable to the FY2000 peak, not dramatically above it.

The Trump administration’s January 2025 executive orders included: emergency proclamation closing the SW border to most asylum claims, reinstatement of Remain in Mexico, termination of CBP One, expanded expedited removal nationwide, and military deployment to the border.

Measured results through early 2026:

• SW border encounters down 93–96% from prior-year comparisons
• FY2025 full-year: 237,538 — lowest since 1970
• Monthly lows: Oct 2025 (7,988), Nov (7,349), Dec (6,472), Jan 2026 (6,070)
• UAC apprehensions on track for ~6,840 — down 93% from FY2023
• Zero releases for 5+ consecutive months
• Interior deportations multiplied significantly

Caveat: These statistics come from CBP/DHS press releases framed in explicitly political language. The raw numbers are verifiable government data, but readers should consult the primary CBP stats portal rather than press releases for neutral presentation.

Even adjusting for recidivism, the number of unique individuals who crossed or attempted to cross during FY2021–2024 exceeded any prior period. The adjusted figures are still historically high.

Got-aways represent a genuine security gap: an estimated 600,000–670,000 per year at peak means hundreds of thousands of unknown, unvetted individuals entered the country. The risk distribution within this population is unknowable by definition — and that unknown itself is a security concern.

The immigration court backlog (3.7M+ cases, 4–5 year average wait) means “catch and process” amounted to de facto release for most encountered individuals. Enforcement without adjudication is not functional enforcement.

Cartel operational control of most crossing routes generates billions in revenue ($5,000–$15,000+ per person). The humanitarian and national security consequences of this cartel business model are real. Fentanyl trafficking — responsible for approximately 75,000 U.S. deaths in 2023 (CDC) — occurs primarily through legal ports of entry, but weakened border environments complicate interdiction.

Cities like New York spent $4.3 billion on migrant services from July 2022 to March 2024. State and local costs are not captured in federal analyses like the CBO report.

Adjusted for recidivism and methodology changes, the “record” numbers are less exceptional than headlines suggest. FY2021’s 1.73 million encounters represented roughly 1.2 million unique individuals — lower than FY2000’s 1.64 million in an era with no Title 42 inflation.

Enforcement was historically robust: 4.8 million removed/expelled, 660,000 formal Title 8 actions in the 12 months after Title 42 ended. The “open borders” claim is unsupported by any enforcement metric.

Push factors — climate disruption, gang violence, political instability in Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua — drive migration volumes more than U.S. policy. The asylum system exists precisely for these situations. Framing legal asylum presentation at ports of entry as a “crisis” mischaracterizes what the law permits.

The economic case is strong: the CBO’s February 2024 report projects the immigration surge will increase GDP by approximately $7–8.9 trillion over the 2024–2034 window and reduce the federal deficit by roughly $0.9 trillion.

Migration Policy Institute (MPI): Enforcement-only approaches without expanded legal pathways are generally less effective than combined approaches. Title 42 did not deter crossings — it incentivized rapid re-attempts. The post-Title 42 shift to Title 8 actually improved deterrence through formal consequences.

Cato Institute: Immigration is net economically positive. Legal channels are too restricted, pushing people to illegal entry. The “crisis” framing often overstates the actual security risk relative to economic benefit.

Congressional Budget Office (2024): The immigration surge increases federal revenues, reduces deficits long-term, expands the labor force, and puts modest downward pressure on wages only for workers without a high school diploma. However, the CBO analysis excludes state and local costs, which can be substantial in receiving cities.

Note: CBO analysis covers federal impacts only. State/local costs — education, healthcare, shelter — are excluded and can be substantial in receiving communities.